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Analysis of accident data by the Federal Aviation Administration, the National Transportation
Safety Board, and other sources show that loss of control is the leading cause of aircraft
accidents. Further evaluation of the data indicates that the majority of loss of control accidents
are caused by the aircraft stalling. In response to these data, the Federal Aviation Administration
and the General Aviation Joint Steering Committee emphasize the importance of stall and angleof-attack awareness during flight. The high-profile crash of Air France Flight 447, in which
pilots failed to recover from a self-induced stall, reinforced concerns over the need for improved
stall and angle-of-attack awareness and reinvigorated interest in the debate over the effectiveness
of angle-of-attack information displays. Further support for aerodynamic information in the form
of an angle-of-attack indicator comes from core cognitive engineering principles. These
principles argue for the provision of information about system functioning and dynamics as a
means to ensure a human is always in position to recover a system when technology is unable.
The purpose of this research was to empirically evaluate the importance of providing pilots with
feedback about fundamental aircraft aerodynamics, especially during non-standard situations and
unexpected disturbances. An experiment was conducted using a flight simulator to test the
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effects of in-cockpit angle-of-attack indication on aircraft control following an airspeed indicator
malfunction on final approach. Participants flew a final approach with a target airspeed range of
60 to 65 knots. Once participants slowed the aircraft for final approach, the airspeed indicator
needle would be stuck at an indication of 70 knots. One group of participants flew the final
approach with an angle-of-attack indicator while the other group lacked such an instrument.
Examination of aircraft performance data along the final approach showed that, when confronted
with a frozen airspeed indicator, pilots flying with an angle-of-attack indicator were producing
less airspeed and glideslope deviation than pilots who were flying without an angle-of-attack
indicator. Furthermore, in the absence of airspeed information, pilots with an angle-of-attack
indicator were less prone to slow the aircraft to an airspeed at which the aural stall-warning
activated. Overall, the results of this experiment provide support for making aerodynamic
information available to the pilot, thus contributing empirical results to the aviation-safety debate
over the effectiveness of angle-of-attack information displays.
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CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTION
Human Error and Loss of Control Accidents
With an increase in mechanical reliability of modern aircraft, human error is
progressively more often at the center of attention in both the prevention and analysis stages of
aviation accidents (Wiegmann & Shappell, 2003). Thus, in an effort to better support human
operators performing their tasks, a considerable amount of research has been conducted
addressing areas such as display design, pilot information requirements, pilot situation awareness
(SA) requirements, and pilot-aircraft interaction (e.g., Endsley, 1993, 2001; Flach et al., 2003;
Hameed & Sarter, 2009; Williams, 2002). Despite these continuous efforts, some of the worst
accidents in aviation history involve perfectly flyable airplanes (with minor, recoverable
mechanical problems; or no mechanical problems at all) crashing due to loss of control in flight,
often caused by human error, or more specifically, improper flight control inputs by the pilot
(e.g., Bureau de l’Enquêtes et d’Analyses pour la sécurité de l’aviation civile [BEA], 2012;
National Transportation Safety Board [NTSB], 2010; NTSB, 1975).
In fact, loss of control in flight, either in the presence or the absence of a
system/component failure or malfunction, is identified as the number one cause of fatal
commercial jet fleet accidents from 2002 through 2011 (Boeing, 2012), as can be seen in Figure
1. This trend is also evident in general aviation (GA). When the Federal Aviation Administration
(FAA) conducted a review of fatal general aviation accidents from 2001 to 2010, the majority of
these were identified as loss of control accidents (GAJSC, 2012).
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Figure 1. Worldwide commercial jet fleet fatalities from 2001 through 2010. Classified by type
of event. Adapted from “Statistical Summary of Commercial Jet Airplane Accidents: Worldwide
Operations 1959-2011” by Boeing, 2012, p. 22.

Stall as the Leading Cause of Loss of Control
Detailed analyses of loss of control accidents identified aerodynamic stall as the leading
cause of such accidents. For example, an analysis performed by the NTSB of 20 transportcategory loss of control accidents from 1986 to 1996 revealed that the majority of those
accidents were caused by the aircraft stalling (FAA, 2008). More recently, Lambregts,
Nesemeier, Wilborn, and Newman (2008) analyzed 75 aircraft upset and loss of control
accidents in airline operations from 1993 to 2007. They found aerodynamic stall to be the
number one cause of these accidents and incidents. A summary of their data can be found in
Table 1.
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Table 1
Summary of Upset and Loss of Control Events to Transport Airplanes
Cause
Aerodynamic Stall
Flight Control System
Spatial Disorientation
Contaminated Airfoil
Atmospheric Disturbance
Other
Undetermined
Total

Number
27
16
8
8
6
6
4

Fatalities
848
604
630
200
477
122
380

75

3261

Note. The data presents findings from Lambregts et al. (2008).

Three examples of commercial airplane accidents in which the aircraft inadvertently
entered a stalled condition and the aircrew failed to subsequently recover the aircraft from the
self-induced stall are the crashes of Colgan Air Flight 3407 on approach to Buffalo Niagara
International Airport on February 12, 2009 (NTSB, 2010); Northwest Airlines Flight 6231
(NWA6231) while on a flight without passengers to move the aircraft to Buffalo, New York on
December 1, 1974 (NTSB, 1975); and the crash of Air France (AF) Flight 447 over the Atlantic
Ocean on June 1, 2009 (BAE, 2012).
While detailed causes of the stalls often vary, it is assumed by the GAJSC (2012) that a
significant contributing factor to a number of stall accidents may be a deficit in the pilot’s
aerodynamic state awareness caused by limitations or gaps in aircraft instrumentation.
Air France Flight 447
Past discussions about the possible benefits of angle-of-attack (AOA) information made
accessible to the pilots (e.g., Forrest, 1969; Gee, Guidsick, & Enevoldson, 1971) have been
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renewed after the accident of AF Flight 447 in 2009 (i.e., BAE, 2012; FAA, 2012; GAJSC,
2012). The following is a quick synopsis of the accident of AF Flight 447 according to the final
accident report published by the BAE (2012). The synopsis is not a complete summary of the
report and does not touch on all aspects of the mishap, but rather focuses on the key points of the
accident that are important for the purpose of this study.
AF Flight 447 was scheduled as a flight from Rio de Janeiro Galeao to Paris Charles de
Gaulle airport on June 1, 2009. Over the Atlantic, about two hours into the flight, the airspeed
indications became erroneous which led to the disconnection of the automatic systems including
the autopilot and autothrottle. This was most likely caused by the obstruction of the airspeed
sensors in an ice crystal environment because the airplane was passing through an area of bad
weather. Numerous other failure indications began to develop as a result of faulty data input
from the airspeed sensors to the air data computer of the aircraft.
At the time of the accident, two copilots occupied the cockpit while the experienced
captain was taking a rest. Upon being confronted with the disconnection of the automatic
systems, combined with intermittent airspeed indications and other resulting failure indications,
the two copilots could not bring the aircraft under control. Various inputs to the controls led to
the aircraft exiting normal aerodynamic flight conditions in less than one minute after autopilot
disconnection and the aircraft was subsequently allowed to enter a stall as a result of failed
attempts to regain control. During this time, the captain was called back to the cockpit. The
copilots were not successful in recovering the stall situation that the aircraft was in and could not
give enough information to the captain concerning the state of the aircraft. Neither the copilots
nor the captain subsequently seemed to be able to determine which information about the various
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aircraft systems could be relied on. The stall warning was also unreliable, in part due to
unreliable airspeed data that was being fed to the onboard computers.
For the remainder of the flight, the aircraft was held in a fully stalled condition,
descending towards the water from about 35,000 feet. Throughout the mishap sequence, the
engines were fully functional as were the controls of the aircraft. The aircraft impacted the water
with last recorded values of a vertical speed of -10,912 feet per minute, a ground speed of 107
kts, and a pitch attitude of 16.2 degrees nose-up. All persons on board the flight were killed in
the accident.
Increase Aerodynamic Awareness by Displaying AOA to the Pilot?
Failure to recover from a self-induced stall, especially in the presence of aircraft
malfunctions or other disturbances, has been the leading cause for two recent major accidents in
commercial aviation (BEA, 2012; NTSB, 2010). In addition, stall accidents have historically
been a leading cause of GA fatalities (e.g., Aircraft Owners and Pilots Association [AOPA], n.d;
GAJSC, 2012; Lambregts et al., 2008; NTSB, 1996; NTSB, 2011), and the FAA (2012) and
GAJSC (2012) leave no doubt that stall awareness is currently one of the highest interest items
when it comes to flight safety. Along the same lines, the FAA acknowledges the possible
benefits of AOA indication in the cockpit and recently declared the installation of certain AOA
systems in GA aircraft as minor alterations requiring only a logbook entry instead of a full-up
installation approval process, thus facilitating the installation of such systems (Hirschman, 2012).
Traditional stall warnings in GA aircraft, as well as instrumentation, generally lack the
ability to show the influence of AOA on aerodynamics and only provide a warning when the
aircraft is already very close to a stall. As noted earlier, improving aircraft instrumentation might
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reduce the number of stall accidents by enhancing a pilot’s aerodynamic awareness (GAJSC,
2012).
Research Objectives
Limited research has evaluated the overall effectiveness of in-cockpit AOA indication in
GA. Forrest (1969) surveyed pilots with qualitative measures of effectiveness and did not find a
difference in pilot performance of pilots flying with in-cockpit AOA indication versus pilots
flying without in-cockpit AOA indication during normal flight operations. However, he
acknowledges that the design of the study might have precluded discovering an effect. Gee et al.
(1971) evaluated airspeed indication and AOA indication as aircraft control parameters and
found that AOA indication is not necessarily superior to airspeed indication in all phases of
flight. Furthermore, a cognitive task analysis (CTA) of the approach-to-landing phase performed
by Flach et al. (2003) led them to the conclusion that it might be more effective to focus on better
integration of information displayed to pilots than to present AOA information in the cockpit as a
separate critical variable. While they suggest that new displays should aim at better integration of
aerodynamic information, no concrete examples of such displays are presented (Flach et al.,
2003). Interestingly, neither of these studies specifically examined areas of flight in which AOA
indication is assumed to be most advantageous, namely non-standard situations and disturbance
management.
The purpose of the research described herein was to evaluate the importance of providing
pilots with feedback about fundamental aircraft aerodynamics during non-standard situations and
unexpected disturbances. Specifically, the purpose was to evaluate a pilot’s ability to fly a more
stable approach with the usage of an AOA indicator than without in the event of an airspeed
indicator malfunction. It was not the researcher’s intent to blame available display technology for
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deficits in pilot aerodynamic awareness associated with stall; rather, the intent of the study was
to evaluate how to support aerodynamic awareness. A secondary goal was to test a principle of
cognitive systems engineering, according to which system dynamics and status must be
communicated to the humans in the system if the humans are to help the system adapt, or be
resilient in the face of challenging circumstances.
Hypotheses
In order to test the importance of providing pilots with feedback about AOA, pilots were
confronted with an airspeed indicator malfunction while flying a final approach. One group of
pilots was flying with AOA information, whereas the other group lacked information about
AOA.
The overarching hypothesis was that pilots flying with in-cockpit AOA indication would
be able to better keep the aircraft within a prescribed flight envelope when confronted with an
airspeed indicator malfunctions than pilots flying without in-cockpit AOA indication. The
derived hypotheses are as follows:
H1: Pilots flying with in-cockpit AOA indication are able to fly an overall more stable
approach after being confronted with an airspeed indicator malfunction than pilots without incockpit AOA indication.
H2: Pilots flying a final approach with in-cockpit AOA indication are able to notice a
frozen airspeed indication earlier than pilots flying without AOA indication.
Additionally examined was the frequency with which pilots in each condition allowed the
aircraft to come close to a stall.
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Limitations and Assumptions
This study focused on GA pilots. For generalizability of the findings to the population of
all GA pilots, it would have been desirable to draw a sample from a pool of all GA pilots. The
fact that most of the participants received their flight training from Embry-Riddle Aeronautical
University (ERAU) might have been a limitation of the study; however, considering that the
required piloting abilities for receiving a pilot’s license are the same for all FAA licenses, this
limitation was considered negligible by the researcher.
Another limitation was the usage of a flight simulator on a personal computer. The
control yoke used for flight simulation on a personal computer does not adequately represent the
forces that are acting on a control yoke in a real aircraft. In addition, other controls such as trim
had to be operated by buttons on the control yoke in the absence of more realistic controls.
Furthermore, a decision had to be made about which aircraft to use for simulation. It was decided
to use a Cessna 172 aircraft because this aircraft is commonly used for flight training. The
Cessna was equipped with standard instrumentation although, in recent years, more and more
pilots are primarily trained in aircraft with technologically advanced instrumentation, or glasscockpits. Pilots primarily trained in glass-cockpits might have had difficulty adjusting to older
forms of cockpit instrumentation, such as the round-dial analogue instruments used in the
simulator.
Due to time limitations, pilots were not trained to proficiency in flying with an AOA
indicator. This has two implications for the study. One implication is that using pilots novice to
AOA indicators for the study can provide information about how effectively an AOA indicator
can be used as a backup instrument in case of airspeed indicator malfunctions even after only a
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short training period. The other implication is that the findings of this study, if supportive of
AOA information made accessible to the pilots, would be conservative.
This experiment set out to use quantitative measures in order to assess effectiveness of incockpit AOA indications. It was assumed that airspeed and glideslope deviations would provide
the best insight into a pilot’s ability of flying a stable final approach. More specifically, airspeed
and glideslope deviations were expected to be sensitive to a general decline in aircraft control on
final approach. While other parameters such as lateral deviations on final approach, actual AOA,
pitch angle, and various other measures can provide additional information, none of those were
considered to be of the same level of importance as airspeed and glideslope deviations for
measuring final approach control.
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Definitions of Terms
Angle of Attack

The measured angle between the chord line of an airfoil and the
relative wind (FAA, 2007b).

Chord Line

The chord line of an airfoil is “a straight line drawn through the
profile of the wing connecting the extremities of the leading edge
and trailing edge” (FAA, 2007b, p. 1).

Pilot’s Operating
Handbook

Operations manual for an aircraft, containing checklist, procedures,
limitations, amongst other information. Usually published by the
manufacturer of the aircraft. The military calls the operations
manual for an aircraft the “Dash One”, referring to the numerical
designation of the manual: “-1”. In this publication the term
“Pilot’s Operating Handbook” is used to encompass all operating
handbooks.

Stall

A loss of lift of an airfoil and an increase in drag occurring when
an aircraft is allowed to exceed an angle of attack greater than the
angle for maximum lift (FAA, 2007b).
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List of Acronyms
AF

Air France

AGL

Above Ground Level

ANOVA

Analysis of Variance

AOA

Angle of Attack

AOPA

Aircraft Owners and Pilots Association

ATC

Air Traffic Control

BEA

Bureau de l’Enquêtes et d’Analyses pour la sécurité de
l’aviation civile

CL

Coefficient of Lift

COCOM

Contextual Control Model

CSE

Cognitive Systems Engineering

CTA

Cognitive Task Analysis

ECOM

Extended Control Model

EID

Ecological Interface Design

ERAU

Embry-Riddle Aeronautical University

FAA

Federal Aviation Administration

G

Units of Gravity

Gz

Vertical Component (Units of Gravity)

GA

General Aviation

GAJSC

General Aviation Joint Steering Committee

GPS

Global Positioning System

JCS

Joint Cognitive System
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KDAB

Daytona Beach International Airport

MANOVA

Multivariate Analysis of Variance

MSL

Mean Sea Level

NTSB

National Transportation Safety Board

NWA

Northwest Airlines

PAPI

Precision Approach Path Indicator

POH

Pilot’s Operating Handbook

RMSE

Root-Mean-Square-Error

SA

Situation Awareness
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CHAPTER II
REVIEW OF THE RELEVANT LITERATURE
In modern aviation, the tasks the pilot has to perform can be categorized as aviating,
navigating, communicating, and managing systems. The hierarchy in which those tasks are
performed in has some flexibility, but usually those tasks are prioritized in the order in which
they were just listed (Wickens, 2002). Nowadays, in most commercial aircraft cockpits,
automation has taken over most of the aviating processes. As a result, it seems that the basic task
of aviating, more specifically, keeping the aircraft in an aerodynamically stable condition, can
pose a challenge when the aircrew is confronted with automation or other system failures and
unexpected events (e.g., BEA, 2012; NTSB, 2010). Once the aircraft departs from an
aerodynamically stable condition, previous accidents show that the aircrew might be
unsuccessful at recovering the aircraft back into a stable flight envelope (e.g., BAE, 2012;
NTSB, 1975; NTSB, 2010). While arguably a multitude of factors can be identified as eventually
leading to the failure to recover from a self-induced stall, one possibility is that aircraft
instrumentation might be deficient in supplying the pilot with enough aerodynamic state
awareness which, in turn, might lead to deficits in the pilots’ mental models about the
interactions of aerodynamic forces, which sets the stage for improper recovery attempts from
aerodynamic stalls.
Background to Aerodynamics
If you push the stick forward, the houses get bigger. If you pull the stick back, they get
smaller. That is, unless you keep pulling the stick all the way back, then they get bigger
again (Author unknown).
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An explanation of the basic principles of aerodynamics relating to this research will help
the reader understand the importance of aerodynamic state awareness and proposed display
requirements that follow in later chapters. By no means is the following explanation of basic
aerodynamic concepts meant to be comprehensive. The interested reader is encouraged to refer
to the source documents (e.g., Langewiesche, 1972; see also FAA, 2004, 2007b, 2008) for a
more complete explanation of aerodynamics. Definitions for the technical terms discussed in this
section can be found in the Definitions of Terms section.
The lift equation. An introduction to aerodynamics usually begins with introducing the
general equation of lift for any wing:
𝐿𝑖𝑓𝑡   = 𝐶!   ×  

!  ×  ! !
!

  ×  𝐴  .

(1)

where CL is the coefficient of lift, 𝜌 the density of the surrounding air, 𝑉 the velocity of the wing,
and 𝐴 the wing area. For the purpose of this research, the coefficient of lift (CL) is certainly the
most salient factor in the equation, and plays a central role in how much lift a wing creates at any
time. While the other variables are certainly equally important, CL is mainly controlled by AOA,
which is the focus of this research. Thus, understanding how  CL influences overall lift is
important. Note that the higher the CL, the more lift can be created at a certain velocity and a
certain altitude (the wing area is regarded as a constant here). Also note that with a CL of zero, it
would be impossible to create lift. This short overview of the lift equation should help to
understand the relationships between AOA, CL and overall lift, forming the basis for the
following discussions.
Angle of attack. In his book Stick and rudder: An explanation of the art of flying,
Langewiesche (1972) focuses his introduction on a concept that is very basic to the art of flying:
AOA. He argues that while the concept of how lift is created, namely Bernouilli’s Theorem, is
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often the main focus in the theory of flight and explanation of aerodynamics, the focus should be
on AOA instead. In his words:
It is the plane part of the airplane we have to understand. This plane is inclined so that as
it moves through the air, it will meet the air at an angle and thus shove it downward, in
somewhat the same way that the inclined plane of a snowplow, in moving forward
against the snow, shoves the snow to the side. And the angle by which it is inclined, the
angle at which it meets the air, is for every pilot the most important thing in flight: for
that is the Angle of Attack. (Langewiesche, 1972, p. 10)
Another fundamental point to understand is that the AOA is not the pitch angle of the
aircraft measured from the horizon. In the easiest terms available, “the Angle of Attack is the
angle at which the wing meets the air” (Langewiesche, 1972, p. 7). This air is often referred to as
the relative wind. For a more precise definition, please refer to the Definitions of Terms section.
The FAA’s (2004) Airplane Flying Handbook, designed as “a technical manual to introduce
basic pilot skills and knowledge that are essential for piloting airplanes” (p. iii), provides a figure
to explain AOA and its implications for overall lift (see Figure 2).
As AOA increases, the CL produced by the airfoil usually increases linearly all the way
up to a certain point. This point is called the “critical AOA”. At the critical AOA, the wing
produces maximum lift (for a certain velocity, density, and wing area; refer back to Equation 1),
but at the same time the airflow over the wing begins to separate from the upper surface. If the
AOA is increased beyond the critical AOA, lift decreases and the wing is considered stalled.
Eventually the airflow will completely detach from the upper surface of the wing, resulting in
complete loss of lift.
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Figure 2. Critical angle of attack and stall. Note: The degrees of AOA and coefficient of lift
values specified in the picture are examples only. Adapted from “The Airplane Flying
Handbook” by the Federal Aviation Administration, 2004, p. 4-3.

In summary, when the critical AOA of a wing is exceeded, lift will decrease (due to a
decrease in CL; see Equation 1), drag will increase, and the wing will stall regardless of airplane
speed or attitude (FAA, 2008). Pictures used to explain this phenomenon often use a horizontal
line to depict the relative wind. While this depiction at first may not seem problematic, it often
causes the reader to confuse the relative wind with the horizon line and AOA with pitch attitude.
A clearer approach to showing the dynamics of AOA and the interactions is used by Flach et al.
(2003), depicted in Figure 3.
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Figure 3. Relationships between AOA, centerline of the aircraft, and actual flight path. Adapted
from “A Search for Meaning: A Case Study of the Approach-to-Landing” by Flach et al., 2003.

Another way to look at the concept of AOA is that it is the “difference between where the
airplane points and where (in the up-and-down sense) it goes” (Langewiesche, 1972, p. 11),
depicted by the flight path and centerline of the aircraft in Figure 3.
The connection between load factor and AOA. It is essential, for an aerodynamic
discussion of AOA, to mention the role of load factor. Load factor is a measure of the amount of
acceleration being experienced by an airplane (or any object for that matter), which is usually
quantified by comparing it to the acceleration due to gravity and expressed as units of gravity
along the z-axis (Gz) when addressing the vertical component (FAA, 2008). This discussion will
focus on a simple explanation of vertical load factor only (perpendicular to the floor of the
airplane), because it operationally seems to be the most important factor when examining the
dynamics of AOA. For a more detailed description, refer to FAA (2008). For a less technical
description, see Langewiesche (1972).
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An aircraft in level flight has a vertical load factor of 1.0 Gz (one times the acceleration
due to gravity), which equates to the lift produced by the aircraft being equal to 1.0 times the
weight of the aircraft. An increase in lift, achieved by pulling back on the yoke/stick of the
aircraft, increases the load factor because essentially centrifugal forces are now acting on the
aircraft. If one would increase the load factor to 2.0 Gz, the force created by the airplane would
be twice the force of gravity and the aircraft’s flight path would become curved (FAA, 2008). An
increase in load factor essentially is also an increase in weight of the aircraft. An aircraft at 2.0
Gz, for example, weighs twice as much as an aircraft at 1.0 Gz.
In a turn, lift has a vertical and a horizontal component because it is created perpendicular
to an aircraft’s wings. To make up for the decrease in the vertical component due to the aircraft
turning, an increase in overall lift (by increasing any of the variables of Equation 1 – usually the
CL) is required to keep the vertical component of lift constant, thus maintaining level flight.
During this maneuver, centrifugal forces act on the aircraft and the combined result is an increase
in load factor. In a 60-degree bank turn, for example, 2.0 Gz are acting on the aircraft when
maintaining level flight. An increase in AOA is necessary to generate the lift to support this load
when trying to remain level.
This relationship has major implications for flight. For instance, if a pilot is flying a turn
to lineup with the runway for landing from a perpendicular position to the runway (called baseturn-to-final; see Figure 4 for a graphical description of the maneuver), and initiates this turn too
late, more than the usual amount of bank might be required to prevent the aircraft from
overshooting the runway.
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Figure 4. Turning from base leg to final. A maneuver often used by GA pilots to line up with the
landing runway when flying in the traffic pattern. Adapted from “The Airplane Flying
Handbook” by the Federal Aviation Administration, 2004, p. 8-1.

If the pilot were to use an excessive amount of bank (while still trying to maintain level
flight or a standard descent to the runway), the load factor increases. Worst case, the AOA
required to generate the lift to support this greater load factor might be beyond the critical AOA
and the aircraft might stall. Frequently, pilots feel safe because they are at a relatively high
airspeed but do not account for the increase in load factor and its impact on the AOA in such a
situation. The FAA (2004), especially, warns about the risks of using extremely steep banks in
final turns. In a worst-case scenario, if the aircraft is allowed to enter a stall close to the ground,
altitude might be insufficient for recovery and the aircraft will crash. The list of crashes due to
inadvertent stalls in final turns in GA is long. For examples of stalls in the final turn due to
excessive bank and/or insufficient airspeed, see for instance: AOPA (n.d.), NTSB (1996), and
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NTSB (2011). Factors such as becoming too fixated on the runway can also play a role by
causing the cues for an impending stall to be missed. Especially when close to the ground, it is
very important to recognize the conditions that might lead to a high AOA condition and thus,
worst case, to a stall, so that such situations can be avoided.
The role of airspeed. To elaborate on the role of airspeed, a scenario will be presented to
improve understanding. Assume that an aircraft is flying level at cruise airspeed and
subsequently slows down. Any airspeed above the stall airspeed described in the Pilot’s
Operating Handbook (POH) will work for this example (for details about the POH see the
Definitions of Terms). When reducing the power and slowing the aircraft down, velocity of the
wing decreases, which would lead to a decrease in overall lift (see Equation 1). In order to
continue to maintain adequate lift to keep the aircraft flying level, the pilot can increase the CL
by increasing the AOA (usually by pulling back on the stick/yoke), thus keeping the overall lift
constant even though the velocity is decreased. If the aircraft is slowed further, the AOA needed
to keep overall lift constant might increase up to the critical AOA, eventually exceeding the
critical AOA, and the aircraft will enter a stall.
The airspeed at which the aircraft exceeds the critical AOA varies by condition and
configuration. For example, in the landing configuration, extending the flaps lowers the airspeed
at which the aircraft will stall. At the most basic level, for single-engine GA aircraft, stall speeds
listed in the POH for any particular aircraft are usually the stall speed in the clean configuration
and the landing configuration. The landing configuration is often defined as a certain flap setting
and landing gear extension, while the clean configuration is flaps and gear retracted (in aircraft
with retractable landing gear). The main problem with relying on airspeeds is that airspeed does
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not account for bank angle, load factor, or air density, to name just a few of the factors that might
contribute to an aircraft exceeding the critical AOA.
Aerodynamic Awareness Information Accessible to the Pilot
Despite the critical role of AOA in determining overall lift and the inherent danger of
stalling the aircraft, AOA information is not directly available in many aircraft, including the
Cessna 172, which is the most commonly used aircraft for primary flight training around the
globe. The absence of AOA information in the cockpit, combined with the absence of AOA
information in the POH of many training aircraft suggests that pilots may not adequately learn
about AOA in primary flight training. Thus, other sources of aerodynamic state information have
to be relied on and will now be discussed further. Because available information varies greatly
between different aircraft, two of the most basic forms of aerodynamic information sources,
found in numerous aircraft, will be discussed.
Natural stall warning: buffet. While stall characteristics of aircraft depend heavily on
aircraft design and shape and form of the wings, amongst other factors, most aircraft will
experience airframe buffeting, caused by turbulent airflow over the wings as the air begins to
separate from the wing. In some aircraft, this turbulent air will also reach the horizontal stabilizer
of the aircraft, leading to amplified buffeting of the aircraft. One problem with this kind of
“natural” stall warning is that it gives little or no indication of the situation developing prior to
the airflow becoming turbulent. Another problem is that the amplitude of the buffet might vary
tremendously from aircraft to aircraft, potentially resulting in failure to recognize the cue. And
finally, during high-altitude operations, another form of airframe buffeting may occur, known as
Mach tuck or Mach buffet (FAA, 2008). Mach buffet occurs when an aircraft is flown at or
beyond its critical Mach number, which means a speed at which any part of a wing exceeds
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Mach 1.0. In this case, a shock wave will begin to form on the wing and buffeting will occur.
Under normal circumstances this speed is never reached, but in the case of pilot-induced loss of
control at high-altitude, such an event might occur. On the other hand, because Mach buffet
occurs at high airspeeds, an excessive airspeed or Mach number reading usually separates it
easily from buffeting due to a stalled condition. In case of AF447, airspeed information was
unreliable and was surrounded by other non-standard indications, so the aircrew might have
initially suspected an overspeed condition and possible buffet due to Mach buffet at high-altitude
early in the accident sequence (BEA, 2012). In case of Northwest Airlines (NWA) flight 6231,
the airspeed indicator was falsely indicating a much higher airspeed than the aircraft was actually
at. The crew initially did not recognize the stalled condition of the aircraft, misinterpreting the
airframe buffet as Mach buffet. When they finally recognized that the aircraft was in a stall, they
did not apply the correct recovery procedures (NTSB, 1975).
Artificial stall warning and stick shaker/pusher. Aircraft used in initial pilot training
and GA, such as the Cessna 172 series, are usually fitted with stall warning systems that provide
an aural warning to the pilot at 5-10 kts above stall speed in all configurations (Cessna, n.d.). In
some cases, these warnings are augmented by a visual indication in the form of a warning light.
The Cessna 172 series aircraft, for example, never display AOA information in the cockpit,
unless they are retrofitted with an off-the-shelf system.
Due to the fact that more sophisticated stall warning devices usually require input from
multiple sensors of the aircraft, with those signals being processed by onboard computers, they
have more parts within the system that can fail. This, in turn, might render the stall warning (or
that particular stall warning system) inoperable, or it may become unreliable.

23
Toward Aerodynamic Awareness
Following the above review of real-world practicalities and evidence pointing to the
potential value of AOA information, this discussion will now present pertinent areas of systems
engineering and evaluate potential benefits of in-cockpit AOA indication as a means of
providing fundamental information about system state and dynamics based on relevant research
literature and theory. Initially, the focus will be on areas of systems engineering that
acknowledge the relevance of human factors to their discipline in order to evaluate presentation
of aerodynamic information to the pilot from a human factors perspective within the framework
of engineering. In addition to information being presented, the operator has to be aware of the
information, be able to understand it, and project its meaning and implications into the future. A
discussion about SA and an evaluation of how to support awareness with design, within the
context of providing fundamental aerodynamic information to the pilot, concludes this chapter.
Cognitive systems engineering. At the heart of supporting human performance within a
system is an approach called cognitive systems engineering (CSE). This interdisciplinary
approach is specifically concerned with cognitive functions such as “problem solving, judgment,
decision making, attention, perception, and memory” (Roth, Patterson, & Mumaw, 2002, p. 2).
Drawing from disciplines such as cognitive psychology, cognitive science, and computer
science, the goal is to support human performance within a system (Roth et al., 2002). This is
achieved by applying techniques and knowledge bases of cognitive psychology to the
engineering process, an approach that takes systems engineering of the human-technology
interface further than when just considering the human’s physical limitations (Hollnagel &
Woods, 1983). CSE acknowledges the fact that the human is more than just an informationprocessing system and that the strengths of human cognition, as well as limitations, have to be
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taken into account (Hollnagel & Woods, 2005). Furthermore, CSE is a shift in paradigm from
looking at the individual parts of a system as a decomposition of human and machine, to an
approach that is interested in joint system performance (Hollnagel & Woods, 2005).
The joint cognitive system. A Joint Cognitive System (JCS) approach to CSE considers
the communication between the parts of a system and their interaction, but the main focus is on
“understanding how the joint system performs and how it can achieve its goals and functions”
(Hollnagel & Woods, 2005, p. 18). Figure 5 illustrates how a JCS maintains control over its
processes by showing a cyclical model of steps necessary for controlled performance.

Figure 5. Model of a JCS emphasizing the interdependency of different parts of a system.
Adapted from “Joint Cognitive Systems: Foundations of Cognitive Systems Engineering” by
Hollnagel, E. & Woods, D.D, 2005.

Control theory in human performance. The JCS approach describes human system
interaction in terms that matter in systems engineering – for example, feedback and control. The
cyclical model, combining a feedback and feedforward loop, affects anticipation, as well as
response (Hollnagel & Woods, 2005). To conceptualize control and associated cognition within a
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JCS, Hollnagel and Woods (2005) propose the contextual control model (COCOM). A COCOM
differs from other models of control in that “actions are determined by the context rather than by
an inherent sequential relation between them” (p. 144). Its primary features are four different
control modes corresponding to characteristic differences in the orderliness or regularity of the
context (Hollnagel & Woods, 2005). According to Hollnagel and Woods (2005), those control
modes are as follows:
§

Scrambled control:
The choice of the next action is random, based on blind trial-and-error
performance. A reason for scrambled control might be that the situation
assessment is deficient or paralyzed. For example, if critical information
pertaining to a situation is not being received, this might result in scrambled
control.

§

Opportunistic control:
The situation is not clearly understood or time is limited. Causes of such limited
understanding can be “lack of competence, an unusual state of the environment,
or detrimental working conditions” (p. 147). This leads to planning and
anticipation being limited. Especially when the description of the situation used
by the system to evaluate events and select actions is inadequate, choice of actions
is often inefficient because delayed effects of such actions are not being
considered.

§

Tactical control:
Performance more or less follows a known procedure or rule. In this mode, “the
time horizon goes beyond the dominant needs of the present, but planning is of
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limited scope or range…. The determination of whether an action was successful
will take delayed effects into account” (p. 147).
§

Strategic control:
The time horizon goes beyond that of tactical control. The dominant features of
the current situation have less influence on the choice of action and the JCS can
look ahead at higher-level goals.

Part of control is essentially the ability to compensate for disturbances and disruptions in
a timely and effective manner (Hollnagel & Woods, 2005). Hollnagel and Woods (2005) state
that the scrambled control mode is clearly the least efficient, and that normal human performance
usually is likely to be a mixture of the opportunistic and tactical control modes, with the strategic
control mode requiring so much effort that it cannot be continually sustained.
Because of the fact that performance in a JCS takes effect on several layers of JCS
control simultaneously, the Extended Control Model (ECOM) complements the COCOM. The
ECOM accounts for the fact of simultaneous control of different types during different types of
cognitive work (see Figure 6), where cognitive work within a system often consists of activities
that can be described as tracking, regulating, monitoring, and targeting.
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Figure 6. Different control loops and the interactions between them. Hollnagel and Woods
(2005) acknowledge that these are proposed layers of performance and that the layers are
changeable and extendable. Adapted from “Joint Cognitive Systems: Foundations of Cognitive
Systems Engineering” by Hollnagel, E. & Woods, D.D, 2005.

Of special interest for this discussion is the ECOM’s tracking loop because of its
relevance to flight control. It is concerned with the control activities required to keep the system
within predetermined boundaries or to return the system within boundaries should these have
been exceeded. In addition, the monitoring layer is of particular interest because of an increase in
automation on modern flight decks. Implications will now be further discussed.
Humans give the system resilience. In a JCS such as a modern airliner, the tracking loop
is often taken over by automation for a considerable portion of the flight. It follows that the
major work of the human operator in such complex systems is performed largely in the
monitoring layer and concerned with detecting and dealing with the unexpected events that
might occur (Reason, 1990), a view also shared by Endsley (1997). She describes the human role
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in complex systems as performing tasks that are not easily automated and concludes that the
“human operator has usually remained to insure that the automated systems perform properly
and to detect the occurrence of aberrant conditions” (Endsley, 1997, p. 200). In order to be
considered resilient, a JCS has to be able to handle disruptions and variations that fall outside the
normal adaptive capabilities of the system (Woods, 2006). Thus, if automation is not able to
adapt to disruptions in the system; for example, due to sensor failure as was the case in the AF
Flight 447 accident (BAE, 2012), or due to automation being unable to keep the system within
predetermined boundaries (e.g., NTSB, 2010), the human can give the system resilience by
detecting, reacting to and dealing with the unexpected events that might unfold, eventually
returning the system to within boundaries.
The new role of the pilot as being primarily a supervisory role above the automation in
modern aircraft demands a departure from classical approaches to system design. Flach et al.
(2003) state that with complex systems, such as aircraft, classical approaches to work design will
not be effective because most of the procedural work aspects of those systems are automated.
Essentially, to design for these systems, the goal is to design for understanding of the process
being controlled so that the “operators can assemble the appropriate actions as required by the
situation encountered” (Flach et al., 2003, p. 173). This is achieved by providing the operator
with the information required for a deep understanding of the processes being controlled.
Automation failure and the effects on the JCS. Whenever automation fails and the state
that the system is in is not clearly understood by the operator, the system is likely to degrade to
something close to opportunistic control. In this case, anticipation and planning will become
limited. Even worse, if the operator is not able to assess the situation at all, control might be
degraded to the scrambled control mode and actions taken by the operator will become random.
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There will be a disparity between the actions taken in scrambled control mode, and the
appropriate actions that are required to return the system to its predetermined boundaries.
Usually automation does not just fail without reason but might not be able to cope with
non-standard situations (e.g., BAE, 2012; NTSB, 2010). A disengagement of automation devices
operating the tracking loop of the aircraft (autopilot and autothrottle) will prevent further
adjustments within the tracking loop by automation, transferring control back to the operator. In
a dynamic flying environment, adjustments are constantly needed to keep the aircraft in the
desired state. In addition, margins for safety are small if an aircraft is close to its aerodynamic
performance boundaries at the time of control authority transfer. If the operator is unaware of the
aerodynamic state at the time of automation failure, or cannot quickly enough achieve such
awareness, a breakdown in the tracking loop might occur, and degradation in the control mode of
the JCS might ensue. Only awareness about the situation will provide the operator with the
necessary means to reestablish control in situations where predetermined boundaries were exited.
Consequences of not being able to return the aircraft to the desired state can be disastrous (e.g.,
BAE, 2012; NTSB, 2010) and underline the importance of supporting the operator in providing
resilience by improving awareness in the human operator within a JCS.
Situation awareness. In this section, definitions and concepts of SA will be presented.
The most prominent definition is that of Endsley (1995), defining SA as “the perception of the
elements in the environment within a volume of time and space, the comprehension of their
meaning, and the projection of their status in the near future” (p. 36). In Smith and Hancock
(1995), the definition of SA revolves around “adaptive, externally directed consciousness” (p.
137). They use the term “externally directed” to specify that the “goal of the behavior that SA
directs must reside in the task environment rather than in the agent’s head.” (p. 139). Products of
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SA, according to Smith and Hancock, are knowledge about and directed action within the
environment.
The concept and definitions of SA have sparked various debates. Flach (1995) suggests
treating SA as a phenomenon description and specifically cautions against the concept possibly
being considered a causal agent, as this might lead to circular reasoning and present an obstacle
to productive research. As an example, he utilizes a statement that SA, or the loss thereof, is the
leading cause of human error in military aviation mishaps and describes how it might be
criticized as circular reasoning as follows: “How does one know that SA was lost? Because the
human responded inappropriately. Why did the human respond inappropriately? Because SA was
lost” (p. 151). On the other hand, considering SA as a phenomenon description would be to note
that loss of SA is evident in many pilot errors. According to Flach, only when SA is considered a
phenomenon description does it become very fruitful to research because it challenges
researchers to go beyond simple standard laboratory paradigms in an attempt to recreate the
dynamic, interactive complexity of natural task environments.
Along the lines of Flach, who doubts the falsifiability and thus the theoretical validity and
strength of the SA concept, Dekker and Hollnagel (2004) additionally criticize the concept of SA
as relying on overgeneralization in the sense that the concept is often applied to situations that it
was never meant to speak about. Wickens (2008), on the other hand, defends SA as a “viable and
important construct” while acknowledging that it “still possesses some controversy over
measurement issues” (p. 397) and predicts that the interest in how SA may degrade or can be
supported will continue to grow into the future. He also specifically supports Endsley’s (1995)
definition of SA, stating that it has stood the test of time, albeit a matter of 13 years. The focus of
the following discussion will be on Endsley’s model of SA.
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Endsley (1995) recognizes three different levels of SA. At the most basic level, Level 1,
is perception of the elements in the environment; more specifically the perception of the status,
attributes, and dynamics of relevant elements in the environment.
Level 2 SA is achieved when the agent is able to form a holistic picture of the
environment by incorporating the knowledge of level 1 SA elements into something meaningful,
leading to a comprehension of the situation at hand.
Finally, Endsley defines the highest level of SA (Level 3) as being able to project the
future actions of the elements, with projection extending to at least the very near term. As a
matter of consistent terminology, she distinguishes the term “situation awareness” as a
knowledge state from the processes used to achieve SA, which she combines under the term
“situation assessment”.
In addition, Wickens (2008) states that knowledge structures, such as scripts, schemas,
and expectancies contribute to understanding and comprehending the current state, while
selective attention works to direct the acquisition of information. These elements of cognition
(selective attention and knowledge structures) directly influence Level 1 and Level 2 SA,
according to Wickens (2008).
Decision making, goals, and performance. In a sense, decision making can be linked to
SA but in Endsley’s theory they should not be coupled as parts of one process (Endsley, 2000).
According to Endsley (2000), pilots can have perfect SA and make bad decisions, or can have
low-levels of SA and still make the correct decisions, if purely by luck. Along the same lines,
Wickens (2008) states that good SA is not indicative of good performance and further notes that
“an operator with excellent SA of a failing system may not possess the knowledge of procedures
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to remedy the failure or may not have the motor execution skills to implement that remedy” (p.
398).
While SA is seen as a construct separate from decision making and performance
(Endsley, 1995), the goal of flight deck design should be to furnish the operator with information
required for good SA in order to provide a solid basis for appropriate decisions. Figure 7 shows
how Endsley (1995) links SA and decision making.

Figure 7. Model of SA in dynamic decision making. Adapted from “Towards a theory of
situation awareness in dynamic systems” by Endsley, 1995, p. 35

Note in Figure 7 how individual factors, such as “abilities, experience, and training” contribute
to the formation of SA and how “goals, objectives, and expectations” influence acquisition of
SA, as well as the decision making process.
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Smith and Hancock (1995) base their model of SA primarily on Neisser’s (1976) model
of perception, which emphasizes the perception-action cycle, that is, the importance of active
perception on the part of the user to make sense of a situation that the user is acting in. Their
approach, like Endsley’s, also emphasizes the importance of goals. Smith and Hancock use the
example of finding a car in a parking lot. For them, only if the goal is explicitly stated, can the
quality of the performance be judged, and knowing what must be known in order to solve an
information-processing problem constitutes the person’s SA (Smith & Hancock, 1995).
Furthermore, Smith and Hancock define SA as “a generative process of knowledge
creation” (p. 142), emphasizing that SA is more than merely a current snapshot of the agent’s
mental model; rather, SA guides the process of knowledge modification. In their model, the
knowledge that is created is called the “big picture” of the situation. Experienced personnel are
often self-aware of the process of losing the big picture, which can happen when their big picture
becomes insufficient to support the task (Smith & Hancock, 1995). One of the great advantages
of the approach taken by Smith and Hancock is that such self-awareness is explained by stating
that SA is not the agent’s big picture but rather it is the agent’s SA that builds the big picture.
Regardless of the stance taken when defining the construct of SA, the discussed models
have in common that external goals must exist, and eventually a decision (Endsley, 1995) or
action (Smith and Hancock, 1995) will be taken, resulting in observable performance. The
resulting performance can only be judged if the goals of the operator are known. To illustrate this
point, if a person were observed walking around a parking lot, that person could be doing a
number of things. For example, maybe the person is lost or maybe the person is looking for a car.
Only if the goal (i.e. looking for a car) is known can the performance and SA at the task be
judged. If a system has exited predetermined boundaries, and the operator is to return the system
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to a predetermined state, the operator needs to actively construct knowledge-comprehension of
the unfolding situation. Information displays about the state of the system will support the
operator in doing so.
How to support “knowing what’s going on” using design. In general, it can be said
that the desired state is for the operator to be in control of a system or process at all times. In
most general terms, such a process could be flying the aircraft. Hollnagel and Woods (2005)
identify a number of common conditions that can lead to loss of control. If the conditions that
can cause loss of control are known, appropriate means to combat those conditions can be
deduced. Figure 8 shows examples of loss of control causes and how control can be maintained
or regained if lost.

Figure 8. Determinants of control. Adapted from “Joint Cognitive Systems: Foundations of
Cognitive Systems Engineering” by Hollnagel, E. & Woods, D.D, 2005.
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At the center of being in control of a process is the knowledge of what will happen and
what has happened (Hollnagel & Woods, 2005). In essence this constitutes good SA that can be
supported with adequate interface design. While different approaches to interface design exist,
this section will introduce a theoretical framework called ecological interface design (EID;
Vincente & Rasmussen, 1992).
Ecological interface design. EID is aimed specifically at designing interfaces for
complex human-machine systems, such as a JCS. One of the premises of EID is being able to
provide a detailed symbolic description of an underlying process to the operator if needed for
analytical problem solving, especially during unfamiliar events (Vincente & Rasmussen, 1992).
According to Vincente and Rasmussen, unfamiliar events can either be anticipated or
unanticipated. They further state that unfamiliar but anticipated events occur infrequently, thus
operators might have limited experience to rely on, but designers have most likely built means of
coping with such events into the system. Unfamiliar and unanticipated events pose the biggest
challenge to operators because operators are most likely unfamiliar with these events given their
low probability of occurrence, and designers of the system did not anticipate the event (Vincente
& Rasmussen, 1992).
In unfamiliar and unanticipated events, for the human to be able to provide resilience,
deep control of the system is needed. Operators cannot rely on a built in solution and have to
improvise a solution themselves (Vincente & Rasmussen, 1992). Such deep control “is guided by
the operator’s mental model of the underlying process” (p. 596). Vincente and Rasmussen
further elaborate that research has shown that humans have a tendency to prefer cognitive
strategies that are less versus more effortful. Humans prefer to use established cue-response
patterns and other cognitive shortcuts when possible. Preference for lower levels of cognitive
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control makes it easy for operators to forget, and fail to consider, the underlying properties of the
process that are not shown on the display (Vincente & Rasmussen, 1992).
Ecological interface design and situation awareness. Burns, Jamieson, Skraaning, Lau,
and Kwok (2007) note that both the concepts of EID and SA “contribute to the development of
information displays that improve operator insight into decision-making spaces” (p. 205). They
go on to state that both concepts must, at practical levels, overlap. When considering the three
levels of SA (Endsley, 1995), it becomes clear where those overlaps might be. Perception of the
elements is the basis for Level 1 SA. A good EID will support Level 1 SA by providing the
required information to control the process. In addition, Burns et al. (2007) point out that EID
should support comprehension (Level 2 SA) by communicating the purposeful structure of the
system; and conclude that it should support projection (Level 3 SA), by enabling operators to
make assumptions on the future state of the system based on the mental model that is
externalized by the ecological interface.
Burns et al. (2007) designed displays according to EID for two sections of a nuclear
power plant. Using six nuclear control room-operating crews as participants, they compared
three different interface types, namely EID-based, traditional, and advanced displays. The
traditional display was representative of contemporary displays for nuclear power plants.
Advanced displays added trends and configural graphics to the traditional display. On the other
hand, the EID-based interface provided information that was deemed important to support
anomaly detection, decision making, and action under abnormal events. The control roomoperators were confronted with a total of six scenarios. Three of the scenarios were typical
scenarios that the operators had faced before, and the other three were scenarios that the
operators had never faced before. Burns et al. found that the ecological interface only provided
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advantages over the two other displays when the crews were facing atypical situations.
Ecological interfaces did not provide an advantage on SA measures during scenarios that the
crews were used to. This led Burns et al. to the conclusion that supporting visual information for
anomaly detection, decision making, and action under abnormal events might not help operators
perform strictly procedural tasks. The real advantages of ecological interfaces might be only seen
in unfamiliar and unanticipated events.
Cognitive task analysis. In order to design for systems that support human performance
in cognitive functions such as problem solving, decision making, and attention, up-front analyses
of the demands of the domain and requirements for effective JCS performance need to be
conducted (Roth et al., 2002). CTA methods are methods used to perform those analyses and
assess complex cognitive work. CTA is used to understand the “cognitive activities required of
the … [JCS] and to fashion those requirements into a state that matches both the technical
demands of the application and the operator’s functional characteristics in the cognitive domain”
(Hollnagel & Woods, 1983, p. 592). CTA data can be collected by observing behavior of
operators (in a simulator, for example), studying work artifacts, and using semi-structured
interviews, as examples. Using the data from these sources, processes can be mapped out in
schematic or hierarchical representations to provide the basis for engineering that supports
cognitive work in a given work domain.
Task analysis has been used to evaluate possible benefits of in-cockpit AOA indications.
Flach et al. (2003) wondered if making the AOA explicit in the cockpit could not only lead to the
prevention of stalls but also to a general enhancement of piloting capabilities. They observed
pilot participants in a synthetic task environment flying a final approach to landing. When they
broke down the task into a schematic diagram assessing the couplings between control inputs to
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the aircraft and performance indices, they noticed that the AOA was at a central position in the
diagram. Consequently, they acknowledge the tight coupling of AOA to the piloting task.
Summary
In the previous sections, a mix of design philosophies, strategies for design, and strategies
for assessing the work and determining what information and relationships need to be shown to
operators, have been discussed. All of these philosophies, strategies, and methods center around
the premise that system designs must effectively interface the human and technology
components of a system. In a complex system, knowledge of system state is vital so that an
operator can manage the system appropriately, detect problems early, take over at any given time
if automation fails, and handle abnormal situations adequately. A well-designed interface will
facilitate understanding the dynamics of flight and effectively communicate the state of the
system.
By making AOA explicit to pilots, it can be used for problem solving and
troubleshooting. Displaying AOA provides observability of the aerodynamic state and feedback
that provides insight into the dynamic nature of how control inputs by the operator change this
aerodynamic state, one of the support requirements for cognitive work listed by Woods (2005).
In addition, Woods (2005) lists support for resilience as a requirement for cognitive work, with
cross checks as possible means to avoid premature narrowing and related vulnerabilities in
cognitive work. Overt AOA supports resilience by providing direct feedback to changes in
aerodynamic state and also provide means for cross check, especially if the validity of another
source of information (i.e. airspeed information) is questioned. Being able to assess AOA
information directly facilitates assessing the aerodynamic state, rather than having to integrate
information from various sources (i.e. airspeed indicator, vertical speed indicator, attitude
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indicator). There is no need to integrate individual elements in order to make a higher order
assessment, or more precisely, in order to evaluate the aerodynamic state, thus facilitating
situation awareness and aerodynamic awareness. As such, AOA can be seen as an overall
aerodynamic state indicator providing a clear description of the underlying process. In addition,
understanding the concepts of AOA might require AOA to be more than an abstract concept. If
AOA information is made accessible to the pilot it will facilitate understanding and visualization
of the “dynamics” in aerodynamics, which should positively influence the flexibility of response
required in non-standard situations.
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CHAPTER III
METHODS
Participants
Thirty-four pilots recruited from ERAU participated in the experiment. Two of the
participants produced unusable data due to technical simulator difficulties and were replaced by
two additional participants. Any previous experience flying with in-cockpit AOA indication was
an exclusion criterion for the study. Pilots were required to hold at least a private pilot certificate
and were required to have a minimum of 200 total flight hours to ensure familiarity with standard
piloting procedures. They were equally split by random assignment into two groups, namely an
AOA and No-AOA group. The average age of participants in the AOA condition was 24.44
years (SD = 4.59). In the No-AOA condition, the average age was 21.12 years (SD = 1.86). The
average flight hours for participants in the AOA condition were 1114.69 hours (SD = 1528.6,
Mdn = 285), and 368 hours (SD = 209.28, Mdn = 297.5) in the No-AOA condition. The
relatively large discrepancy in flight hours between the two conditions is further addressed in the
Results chapter.
Participants received an incentive of $20 after participating. The experiment consisted of
a single session, which did not exceed one hour in duration. Participants were required to sign a
consent form (see Appendix B) and informed that they could end their participation in the
experiment at any time and would be paid for the time they have already completed. In addition,
demographic information was collected from the participants. The collected information
included age, total flight hours, and certificates held. See Appendix C for a complete listing of
demographic information requested. All data collected during the experiment is kept
confidential.
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Apparatus
The experiment was conducted with the use of X-Plane 9 flight simulation software
created by Laminar Research. The software ran on a Windows desktop computer with a 22-in
computer screen providing a full-screen view of the aircraft instrument panel and a forward view
from the pilot’s perspective. A yoke and throttle were used as flight controls allowing
participants to interface with the flight simulator. The flight simulation software was used to
simulate a Cessna 172 aircraft, a common initial flight training aircraft that the participants
should have been familiar with. The Cessna 172 was equipped with analogue instrumentation
and lacked a GPS so as to not provide redundant airspeed information. On trials featuring AOA
information, an AOA indicator was displayed on top of the aircraft’s dashboard, to the left and
within the pilot’s outside field of view, a standard position for popular off-the-shelf GA aircraft
AOA indexers (Hirschman, 2012; see also Figure 9). Participants were given the opportunity to
familiarize themselves with the aircraft and instrumentation during practice trials before the
beginning of the experiment.
The AOA indexer used in this experiment was a cue-based AOA indexer (see Figure 9)
and consisted of three symbols calibrated to show optimum AOA for the approach-to-landing
phase and deviations from optimum AOA. For a no-flap final approach, the optimum AOA was
achieved when the aircraft was flown between 60 to 65 kts.
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Figure 9. A cue-based AOA indicator or indexer. The indicator is situated on top of the aircraft’s
dashboard, slightly to the left off-center and within the pilot’s outside field of view. Note that in
this picture the AOA is slightly lower than optimum AOA. Screenshot taken from X-Plane by
Laminar Research.

The three cues used to show AOA were a green donut, a yellow upward pointing
chevron, and a red downward pointing chevron. The green donut in the middle of the instrument
illuminates if the aircraft is flying at optimum AOA for the approach. The yellow upward
pointing chevron on the bottom of the indexer illuminates if the AOA is lower than the optimum
approach AOA. A red downward pointing chevron on the top of the indexer (not illuminated in
Figure 9) illuminates if the AOA is higher than the optimum approach AOA. Combinations of
on-speed and either the upward or downward pointing chevron are possible to show smooth
transitions between optimum AOA and either lower than optimum or higher than optimum AOA.
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The flight simulator used for this study was located in a dedicated research facility and
flanked on either side by cloth dividers. No other activity took place in the facility during the
conduct of this experiment.
A software plugin developed by a software engineering student, Matthew Grasso, from
ERAU was used to record research-critical flight parameters throughout the experiment.
Specifically, the software plugin recorded, among other values, the indicated airspeed of the
aircraft, glideslope deviations, the activation of the stall warning during flight, and whether a
button on the yoke was pressed. The flight data was recorded at a rate of 5 times per second and
automatically saved to an Excel file. An excerpt of such a data-file can be found in Appendix G.
In addition, the plugin automatically failed the airspeed indicator to a frozen position once the
airspeed decreased to 70 kts.
Experimental Design
The experiment was a two-level between subjects design (No-AOA versus AOA). The
dependent variables were: approach speed deviation, glideslope deviation, time until airspeed
indicator malfunction was noticed, whether and how often the stall warning horn activated
during flight, and correct identification of the malfunction.
Participants in the No-AOA condition flew practice and experimental trials without the
addition of an AOA indicator, whereas pilots in the AOA condition flew practice and
experimental trials with an AOA indicator added to the instrumentation. The required sample
size of 32 participants for such a design with two outcome variables was calculated a priori using
a statistical power analysis program called G*Power Version 3.1.6 from the Heinrich Heine
Institute for Experimental Psychology at the University of Duesseldorf, Germany (Faul,
Erdfelder, Lang, & Buchner, 2007). Specifically, the required sample size was calculated for an
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F-Test Multivariate Analysis of Variance (MANOVA) using α = .05, power (1-β) = .8, and an
effect size of f2 = 0.35. It was assumed that the experimental interventions in this study would
produce a large effect which Cohen (1988) assumes to be f2 = 0.35. The statistical power of .8
was chosen as a trade-off between feasible sample-size and statistical power.
Pilot Testing
Pilot testing was performed with two volunteer pilots from ERAU to optimize the flow of
the experiment and to determine how many practice and experimental trials should be flown to
provide a balance between adequate training and possible boredom effects. Furthermore, it was
necessary to evaluate the airspeed indicator malfunction in terms of its detectability, and
dependent variable sensitivity. In addition, the software plugin was tested and validated.
Initially, it was planned to have participants fly 10 practice approaches and four
experimental trials. During pilot testing it was determined that the 14 planned approaches were
too many as sloppiness was observed due to boredom and complacency effects. The total number
of approaches was cut down to a total of eight approaches, namely six practice and two
experimental trials. The pilot tests were used to evaluate the initial approach parameters for
setting up the aircraft along the approach path. The resulting setup that was deemed adequate for
the experiment is described in the next paragraph.
Procedure
The researcher followed an experiment script (shown in Appendix E) to standardize the
conduct of the experiment. Participants were welcomed to the study and asked to read and sign
the consent form (see Appendix B). Demographic information was collected using the
questionnaire in Appendix C. They were informed that this experiment is “concerned with
examining possible advantageous effects of in-cockpit angle-of-attack indications during flight”.
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In addition, they were told that it is of utmost importance that they do not talk to their friends or
colleagues about the events experienced during the experiment. This was done to prevent
incoming participants from being prepared for an airspeed indicator malfunction. Incoming
participants were asked if they had heard anything about the exact nature of the experiment.
The task. The pilots’ task was to conduct final approaches to Runway 34 at Daytona
Beach International Airport (KDAB). All approaches were set up on a 3 nm final, along the
runway centerline, on glideslope, corresponding to at an altitude of 1000 ft MSL. The initial
airspeed for the setup was 90 kts.
Participants were instructed to maintain a 3° glideslope during the descent towards the
runway. Furthermore, participants were instructed to slowdown to between 60-65 kts as quickly
as possible and to fly a no-flap final approach. An aid to visualization of the proper glideslope
was provided in form of a precision approach path indicator (PAPI; an array of four lights
usually situated to the side of a runway showing glideslope deviations to the pilot) situated to the
left of the runway and calibrated for a 3° glideslope. Participants were required to aim for a
touchdown 1000 ft beyond the runway threshold because this aiming point is consistent with the
alignment of the PAPI. They were informed that transition to landing was neither required nor
desired. This was done in an effort to produce usable data for the entire approach and to not skew
the results. Any early transition to landing would have impacted the glideslope and airspeed
deviation data. The simulation froze prior to the aircraft touching down. Upon simulation freeze,
the aircraft was reset to the starting point of the approach.
Training. Before the experiment began, participants in the AOA group were instructed
on the usage of an AOA indicator for flight. This training session lasted about 15 minutes.
PowerPoint slides from this introduction are provided in Appendix F. Specifically the concept of
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AOA was reiterated and the symbology of the AOA indicator explained. Some participants had
misconceptions about AOA that had to be corrected during training. These misconceptions are
further discussed in the Discussions, Conclusions, and Recommendations chapter.
Practice trials. In the first six trials, pilots flew practice approaches, one per trial, to
familiarize participants with the aircraft, the controls of the aircraft, and the general task. They
featured a 10-kt headwind and clear skies. There were no malfunctions or wind speed changes
during these approaches.
Pilots in the AOA condition were instructed on the correct usage of the AOA indexer as a
means of crosschecking final approach speeds. For the first three approaches, participants in the
AOA group were further instructed to induce airspeed deviations to develop an understanding of
how the AOA indexer works and how it can be useful in detecting anomalies during final
approach. In order to provide consistency for pilots in both conditions, during the first three
approaches, the No-AOA group was also instructed to explore a range of airspeeds on final.
Following the first three approaches, participants flew three additional approaches. For
those additional approaches, they were told to focus on flying stable approaches and to minimize
glideslope, horizontal, and airspeed deviations. After the practice approaches, experimental trials
began.
Experimental trials. At the beginning of the experiment trials, participants were told that
they would encounter different initial headwind conditions and a possible aircraft malfunction
over the next set of trials. Before each experimental trial, the participant was asked to identify
any suspected aircraft malfunction as soon as he or she detected it by pressing a button on the
control yoke. The time at which the pilot pressed the button to indicate a suspected malfunction
was recorded. Participants were instructed that their task would be to deal with the different
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headwind situations and the possible malfunction while still striving to accomplish a stabilized
approach. Pilots were informed that discontinuing the approach, although certainly an option in a
real-life scenario, would not be a valid option for the purpose of this experiment.
Participants were not told during which trial the malfunction would occur, nor did they
know how many experimental trials they were facing. A total of two experimental trials were
performed. The first trial included a steady headwind of 30 kts, whereas the second trial included
a headwind at 25 kts and an airspeed indicator malfunction. While the participant slowed to final
approach speed, the airspeed indicator failed automatically when the aircraft’s airspeed passed
through 70 kts. Failure of the airspeed indicator was simulated by a frozen indication of airspeed.
During all trials, if the aircraft would get too close to a stall, the sound off a stall warning
horn would activate. The times at which the stall warning horn activated during flight were
recorded. Furthermore, at the end of each experimental trial, the participant was asked if any
malfunction was present during final approach. Answers from the experimental trial that
included the airspeed indicator malfunction were scored as “1” if the participant correctly
identified the airspeed indicator malfunction and as “0” if the participant did not suspect any
malfunction or identified the malfunction as being of a different kind.
Data Processing
Data collected from the second trial were used in the data analysis. Deviations from
glideslope and airspeed indications were measured at 5-second intervals throughout the
approach. The data used for glideslope and airspeed analysis in this study were taken from the
point along the approach at which the aircraft passed through 500 ft above ground level (AGL) to
the point at which the aircraft passed through 100 ft AGL. The main underlying reason for using
the described range of data is that the FAA (2007a) states that an aircraft should be stabilized on
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a final approach before descending through an altitude of 500 ft AGL in visual meteorological
conditions (i.e., simplified, conditions that allow for being able to see the runway during the
entire approach). Descending through the last 100 ft AGL of the approach, the participant might
already have started a transition to landing, although told not to do so. This was observed in trials
and most likely occurred due to personal habits that the participant might have acquired during
their flying career. The resulting data range will be referred to as “final approach data” for the
remainder of this document and measures taken during the experiment will now be discussed in
more detail.
Airspeed and glideslope deviation. Airspeed deviation was calculated as the root-meansquare-error (RMSE) of all airspeeds that fell outside the prescribed range of 60 to 65 kts. In
addition, glideslope deviation was calculated as the RMSE of deviations that fell outside of the
PAPI on-glideslope indication. More specifically, PAPIs have an allowable range for which they
show an “on 3° glideslope” indication. This is indicated by the PAPI showing two white and two
red lights. Thus, the actual glideslope will be between an upper-boundary of 3.21° and a lowerboundary of 2.81° while the PAPI shows an on-glideslope indication. Upper and lower
boundaries were calculated by Lloyd (2012) for a PAPI system modeled in X-Plane and might
differ outside of the simulation. Refer to Figure 10 for a graphical representation. Deviations (in
feet) outside of the upper and lower limit of the on-glideslope indication were recorded and the
RMSE of such deviations calculated for each participant.
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Figure 10. Upper and lower PAPI boundaries with respective PAPI indications. Adapted from
“The Effect of System lag on Unmanned Air System Internal Pilot Manual Landing
Performance” by Lloyd, M. E., 2012.
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CHAPTER IV
RESULTS
Descriptive Statistics
Approach control was operationalized as airspeed and glideslope control on final
approach. It was hypothesized that participants flying with in-cockpit AOA indication would be
able to fly a more stable final approach than participants without in-cockpit AOA indication after
failure of the airspeed indicator. The RMSE of airspeed and glideslope deviations for the final
approach data was calculated for each participant and will initially be discussed separately in the
descriptive analysis. Table 2 shows descriptive statistics for the RMSE of airspeed deviations of
the two groups (AOA versus No-AOA).

Table 2
RMSE Descriptive Statistics for Airspeed Deviations (kts)
Condition
AOA
No-AOA

n
16
16

𝑋
1.32
3.98

SD
1.10
3.87

Min.
0.26
0

Max.
3.46
14.8

As shown in Table 2, the minimum value for RMSE in the No-AOA conditions is 0. This
is because an airspeed range was given for participants to fly and one of the participants in the
No-AOA group was able to fly the final approach exactly within those prescribed values. It can
also be seen that the range of airspeed deviations was larger in the No-AOA group (14.8 kts) as
opposed to the AOA group (3.2 kts). The maximum value of 3.46 kts for the AOA group, and
14.8 kts for the No-AOA group, when compared to their respective means, suggests that the data
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might be positively skewed. The boxplot shown in Figure 11 also supports the assumption that
the data might be positively skewed.
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Figure 11. Boxplot of RMSE airspeed.

Skewness values were calculated using MINITAB’s b1 formula (Joanes & Gill, 1998).
MINITAB’s b1 formula has been shown to generate the smallest mean-squared error in small
samples that are normally distributed, when compared to other methods of calculating skewness
(Joanes & Gill, 1998). Skewness values were found to be 0.88 in the AOA condition and 1.4 in
the No-AOA condition respectively. Figure 11 shows the presence of an extreme score in the
No-AOA group. A Q-Q plot of RMSE airspeed suggests that the data for both groups are not
following a normal distribution (see Figure 12).
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Figure 12. Q-Q plot of RMSE airspeed. Data for the AOA group is presented in the left plot and
data for the No-AOA group in the right plot.

To quantify departure from normality, a Shapiro-Wilk test was performed for both the
AOA and No-AOA groups. The RMSE airspeed data in the AOA group were non-normal (W =
0.798, p = .003), as were the RMSE airspeed data in the No-AOA group (W = 0.825, p = .006).
In order to reduce skewness of the data and attempt to normalize the datasets, a
logarithmic transformation was applied (Field, Miles, & Field, 2012; Howell, 2012). Because the
data included a value that was 0, a constant of +1 was added to all airspeed RMSE data before
performing the logarithmic transformation (Field et al., 2012; Howell, 2012). After
transformation, the data were visually assessed again using Q-Q plots (see Figure 13).
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Figure 13. Q-Q plot of RMSE airspeed (transformed data). Data for the AOA group is presented
in the left plot and data for the No-AOA group in the right plot.

Logarithm RMSE Airspeed plus Constant

The resulting boxplot of the transformed RMSE airspeed data can be seen in Figure 14.
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Figure 14. Boxplot of RMSE airspeed (transformed data). Data for the AOA group is presented
in the left plot and data for the No-AOA group in the right plot.
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By visual inspection of Figures 13 and 14, it can be deducted that skewness has been
reduced and extreme scores have been eliminated. The calculated skewness values are reduced to
0.61 for the AOA group, and -0.04 for the No-AOA group respectively. Results from the
Shapiro-Wilk test performed on the transformed data suggest data from the No-AOA group to be
normally distributed (W = 0.971, p = .853). The Shapiro-Wilk test still indicates non-normality
for the data from the AOA group (W = 0.866, p = .023). However, when comparing Q-Q plots
(Figures 12 and 13) it can be seen that the distribution of data in the AOA group improved after
transformation in terms of approaching normality.
An additional measure used to assess the overall stability of the final approach was the
RMSE of glideslope deviations. The descriptive statistics can be found in Table 3.

Table 3
RMSE Descriptive Statistics for Glideslope Deviations (ft)
Condition
AOA
No-AOA

n
16
16

𝑋
17.04
24.39

SD
17.86
17.59

Min.
0.64
3.95

Max.
58.73
65.46

In contrast to the RMSE of airspeed deviations, the RMSE of glideslope deviations does
not show a floor effect. The lowest value is 0.64 ft, indicating that none of the participants were
able to fly along the glideslope exactly within prescribed PAPI limits at all times. Again, the
maximum values, when compared to their respective means, suggest a possible positive skew to
the data. A boxplot for the data had been generated (see Figure 15).

55

RMSE Glideslope

60

40

20

0
AOA

NoAOA

Instrumentation

Figure 15. Boxplot of RMSE glideslope.

Figure 16 supports the existence of a positive skew to the data and shows the presence of
an extreme score. Skewness values were found to be 1.00 in the AOA, and 0.93 in the No-AOA
condition. Q-Q plots were generated for the data (see Figure 16).
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Figure 16. Q-Q plot of RMSE glideslope. Data for the AOA group is presented in the left plot
and data for the No-AOA group in the right plot.
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A Shapiro-Wilk test performed on the RMSE glideslope data indicated non-normality for
both datasets (AOA group: W = 0.834, p = .008; No-AOA group: W = 0.869, p = .026). Thus, a
logarithmic transformation was applied to the glideslope data as well. This time, no constant was
added because the smallest value was greater than 0 in both datasets (RMSE AOA and RMSE
No-AOA). After transformation, the data were again inspected for normality (Figure 17).
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Figure 17. Q-Q plot of RMSE glideslope (transformed data). Data for the AOA group is
presented in the left plot and data for the No-AOA group in the right plot.

The Q-Q plot in Figure 17 supports the assumption that, after logarithmic transformation,
the data is more normal than before the transformation was applied. Skewness values are now
reported at -0.28 in the AOA, and -0.15 in the No-AOA condition. Furthermore, results by the
Shapiro-Wilk test indicate normality of the transformed data (AOA group: W = 0.943, p = .393;
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No-AOA group: W = 0.970, p = .845). The resulting boxplot, shown in Figure 18, further
supports these assumptions and shows that the extreme score has been eliminated.
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Figure 18. Boxplot of RMSE glideslope (transformed data).
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Figure 19. Mean values of RMSE airspeed and RMSE glideslope. Data for RMSE airspeed is
presented in the left plot and data for RMSE glideslope in the right plot.
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Figure 19 shows the means of untransformed data. Confidence intervals are deliberately
not displayed because they do not represent an accurate estimation if derived from skewed data
in combination with small sample sizes. Figure 20 shows bar charts for the transformed data with
the respective 95% confidence intervals. The relatively large confidence interval for RMSE
glideslope in the AOA condition is discussed in the Discussions, Conclusions, and
Recommendations chapter.
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Figure 20. Mean values of RMSE airspeed and RMSE glideslope (transformed data). Error bars
represent a 95% confidence interval. Data for RMSE airspeed is presented in the left plot and
data for RMSE glideslope in the right plot.

Hypothesis Testing
A multivariate analysis of variance (MANOVA) was performed to determine if there is a
difference in groups (AOA versus No-AOA) for the dependent variables RMSE airspeed and
RMSE glideslope. The test was followed-up with two separate analyses of variance (ANOVAs).
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All tests were performed using the transformed data. The descriptive statistics for the
transformed data can be found in Table 4.

Table 4
Descriptive Statistics for the Log-Transformed Data
Measure
Log RMSE Airspeed
Log RMSE Glideslope

Condition
AOA
No-AOA

n
16
16

𝑋
0.75
1.35

SD
0.43
0.74

Min.
0.23
0

Max.
1.50
2.76

AOA
No-AOA

16
16

2.15
2.95

1.36
0.74

-0.44
1.37

4.07
4.18

Note. The airspeed data represents the log-transformed data after the constant +1 had been added.

The assumptions for a MANOVA and ANOVA were tested using the transformed data.
Assumptions for a MANOVA are independence of the observations, random sampling,
multivariate normality, and homogeneity of covariance matrices (Field et al., 2012). The former
two assumptions were met by the research design. In addition, homogeneity of variance was
tested for both dependent measures in order to test this assumption for the follow-up ANOVAs
that were performed.
Multivariate normality. To test for multivariate normality, the Shapiro-Wilk test of
multivariate normality was performed. In the case of the transformed RMSE airspeed data, the
Shapiro-Wilk test of multivariate normality indicated that multivariate normality can be assumed
(W = 0.947, p = .446). The same is true for the transformed RMSE glideslope data (W = 0.968, p
= .808).
Homogeneity of variance. Homogeneity of variance was assessed using Levene’s test of
equality of error variances. The test revealed that sample variances in transformed RMSE
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airspeed data did not differ in the AOA and No-AOA groups, F(1, 30) = 2.212, p = .147. Thus,
for the airspeed data, homogeneity of variance can be assumed. However, when applied to the
transformed RMSE glideslope data, the test revealed a difference between sample variances, F(1,
30) = 8.225, p = .007, indicating that homogeneity for this data cannot be assumed. The ANOVA
is considered a robust test concerning the violation of the assumption of homogeneity of variance
(Howell, 2012). As such, the results of the ANOVA will still provide valid results, even when
the assumption is violated, as is the case of the transformed RMSE glideslope data.
Homogeneity of covariance matrices. Homogeneity of covariance matrices was tested
by submitting the transformed data to Box’s M. Box’s M produced significant results at p = .003
indicating that the covariance matrices are unequal. However, Box’s M is highly susceptible to
deviations from multivariate normality (Field et al., 2012). In any case, the Hotelling’s Trace
statistic is robust to violation of the assumption of homogeneity of variances when sample sizes
are equal (Field et al., 2012; Howell, 2012).
MANOVA and follow-up results. Using Hotelling’s Trace statistic, a significant effect
of airspeed RMSE and glideslope RMSE was found for group (AOA versus No-AOA), T =
0.275, F(2, 29) = 3.991, p = .029, η2 = .216. Univariate ANOVAs of the dependent measures
also revealed an effect of group. Participants in the AOA group produced lower airspeed
deviations than participants in the No-AOA group, F(1, 30) = 7.930, p = .009, η2 = .209. In
addition, participants in the AOA group produced less glideslope deviation than participants in
the No-AOA group, F(1, 30) = 4.228, p = .049, η2 = .124. The hypothesis that pilots flying with
in-cockpit AOA indications are able to fly a more stable approach than pilots flying without
AOA indications in the event of an airspeed indicator malfunction is supported.
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Time until airspeed indicator malfunction was noticed. Participants were instructed to
press a button on the yoke when they noticed any malfunction during the experimental trials.
During the actual experiment, most of the participants who noticed a malfunction forgot to press
the button and some of them, as discussed later, did not notice any malfunction even though the
airspeed indicator was frozen at 70 kts. As such, this measure did not produce required data for
analysis and the hypothesis that pilots flying with in-cockpit AOA indication are able to identify
an airspeed indicator malfunction earlier than pilots flying without AOA information could not
be tested. However, additional measures provided further insight into the effectiveness of AOA
indications and will be discussed later in this chapter.
Correlation Between Flight Hours and the Dependent Variables
In the Methods chapter, it was noted that the difference in mean flight hours of
participants in the two groups (𝑋 = 1114.69 hrs in the AOA group, 𝑋 = 368.00 hrs in the NoAOA group) was relatively large. The correlation between flight hours and the dependent
variables (airspeed RMSE and glideslope RMSE) was assessed to determine if the difference in
flight hours biased the outcome of the experiment. A Mann-Whitney U test was performed on
flight hours to determine if flight hours were significantly different between the two groups. The
Mann-Whitney U statistic was not significant, supporting the null hypothesis that the distribution
of flight hours is the same across both conditions (AOA versus No-AOA), p = .809.
Furthermore, scatterplots of the data were generated to visually inspect the relationship of flight
hours with the dependent variables airspeed (shown in Figure 21) and glideslope (shown in
Figure 22) deviations.

62

Flight Hours ~ RMSE Airspeed − AOA Group

Flight Hours ~ RMSE Airspeed − No AOA Group
15

RMSE Airspeed

RMSE Airspeed

3

2

10

5

1

0
1000

2000

3000

4000

200

400

Flight Hours

600

800

1000

Flight Hours

Figure 21. Scatterplots of flight hours plotted against RMSE airspeed for the AOA group (left)
and the No-AOA group (right).
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Figure 22. Scatterplots of flight hours plotted against RMSE glideslope for the AOA group (left)
and the No-AOA group (right).

Both Figure 21 and Figure 22 suggest the absence of a relationship between flight hours
and performance measures. In order to quantitatively evaluate the relationship, correlation
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coefficients were computed. Flight hours do not have a normal distribution and could not be
normalized through transformation. Due to the non-normal distribution of one variable, the nonparametric Spearman correlation coefficient was computed. The coefficients and associated
probability values are presented in Table 5 and indicate that none of the relationships are
significant at p < .05.

Table 5
Spearman’s Correlation Coefficient (rs) for the Relationships between Participant Flight Hours
and Performance Measures
Correlation of Flight Hours by
Airspeed RMSE (AOA group)
Airspeed RMSE (No-AOA group)
Glideslope RMSE (AOA group)
Glideslope RMSE (No-AOA group)

rs
.384
-.017
.445
-.179

p
.142
.928
.084
.506

Note. The assumed null hypothesis is that there is no linear relationship.

Additional Measures
Stall warning horn activation during flight. The number of occasions on which
participants let the aircraft come close to a stall after the airspeed indicator failed was examined.
Data from the beginning to the end of data recording were examined for activation of the stall
warning horn. Results indicate that, in the AOA group, only 2 out of 16 participants, or 12.5%,
let the airspeed decline all the way to the activation of the stall warning horn. However, in the
No-AOA group, 8 out of 16 participants, or 50%, let the airspeed decline to the point at which
the stall warning horn was activated. In order to determine whether activation of the stall
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warning was contingent on the experimental condition that the participants were in, Pearson’s
Chi Square was calculated. The corresponding 2x2 contingency table can be found in Table 6.

Table 6
Contingency Table (Stall Warning Horn Activation in the AOA versus No-AOA Condition)
Total

Stall Warning
Condition
AOA
No-AOA

Yes
2 (5)
8 (5)

No
14 (11)
8 (11)

16
16

Total

10

22

32

Note. Expected frequencies if condition and stall warning horn activation were independent of
each other are listed in parentheses.

The resulting 𝜒!! = 5.236 was statistically significant at p = .022. This indicates that stall
warning horn activation and the condition that the participants were in (AOA versus No-AOA)
were related. In this particular case, as noted above, in the No-AOA group more participants let
the airspeed decline to the stall warning than in the AOA group. A more detailed analysis reveals
that some of the participants let the airspeed decline on more than one occasion to a point at
which the stall warning horn activated. Table 7 shows the number of distinct occasions on which
the stall warning activated by participant and group.

65
Table 7
Number of Stall Warning Horn Activations by Participant
Condition
AOA
No-AOAa
2
1
2
1
1
4
1
4
1
3
a

Note. For ease of readability, a dash is displayed if there was no stall warning horn activation.
a

n = 16.

Identification of the malfunction. Immediately after the experimental trial during which
the airspeed indicator malfunction was induced, participants were asked if they had noticed any
malfunction during the final approach. Fewer participants in the AOA group than in the NoAOA group identified the airspeed indicator malfunction correctly. In the AOA group, 10 out of
16, or 62.5%, of the participants identified the airspeed indicator malfunction. In the No-AOA
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group, 14 out of 16, or 87.5%, of the participants were aware that the airspeed indicator had
malfunctioned. The data were plotted in a 2x2 contingency table and can be found in Table 8.

Table 8
Contingency Table (Correct Identification of the Malfunction in the AOA versus No-AOA
Condition)

Condition
AOA
No-AOA
Total

Identified Malfunction
Yes
No
10 (12)
6 (4)
14 (12)
2 (4)
24

8

Total
16
16
32

Note. Expected frequencies if condition and correct identification of the malfunction were
independent of each other are listed in parentheses.

Due to the fact that the expected frequencies of two cells in Table 8 had an expected
count of less than five, Fisher’s Exact Test was used instead of Pearson’s Chi Square (Howell,
2008) to test the null hypothesis that the two variables are independent. Fisher’s Exact Test was
non-significant, p = .22 and it can be concluded that the condition that the participants were in
(AOA versus No-AOA) was independent of whether they identified the malfunction correctly or
not.
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CHAPTER V
DISCUSSIONS, CONCLUSIONS, AND RECOMMENDATIONS
Overall, this experiment showed that pilots flying with in-cockpit AOA indication were
able to fly a more stable final approach than pilots flying without in-cockpit AOA indication
when confronted with an airspeed indicator malfunction. Furthermore, 8 out of 16 participants in
the No-AOA condition allowed the aircraft to come too close to a stall during final approach,
indicated by the activation of the aircraft’s stall warning horn. This only happened to 2 out of 16
participants in the AOA condition, suggesting that participants in the AOA condition not only
flew a more stable approach but also a safer approach than participants in the No-AOA
condition. These findings support the effort of educating GA pilots about AOA and the push for
installation of AOA devices in GA aircraft (e.g., FAA, 2012; GAJSC, 2012; Hirschman, 2012).
The results of the experiment further indicated that a device such as an AOA indicator
may be useful after just a short training period, albeit the fact that the full potential might not
have been understood by the pilots. The short training period, however, should not be understood
as sufficient to train pilots on the usage of AOA indicators. The AOA indicator develops its full
potential only after the concept is well understood and proficiency in using the indicator has been
acquired. Therefore, it would be interesting to see what kind of results would be obtained if the
study would be replicated using pilots who are already experienced with flying with an AOA
indicator. It is assumed by the researcher that results would become stronger and more uniform
in the AOA condition. Not all pilots in GA have experience with flying with AOA indications.
While it could be argued that maybe military pilots who are experienced in flying with AOA
indicators might be used for such a study, it is doubtful that the results could be generalized to
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the GA community due to the fact that military and GA pilots arguably present different
populations.
Effect Sizes, Confidence Intervals, and Possible Confounds
The study produced relatively small effect sizes, indicating that there might have been
other variables that influenced performance. In addition, confidence intervals for airspeed and
glideslope deviations were relatively large. In general, it can be assumed that once research
moves from basic to applied research, there will always be more confounding variables to deal
with and effort must be taken to identify these. Possible confounds are now further discussed.
The experiment used flight simulation with a generic Cessna 172 cockpit layout and
relatively primitive controls lacking feedback about the actual forces that would act on the
control yoke during actual flight. In addition, trim for the aircraft had to be established using
buttons on the yoke, as opposed to a control wheel in a real Cessna 172. It might have been that
some participants were able to adjust to these conditions better than others. In addition, in recent
years, more and more pilots are solely trained in technologically advanced cockpits, also referred
to as glass-cockpits. Thus, when presented with standard instrumentation, the adaption time of
those pilots may vary.
During the experiment and interviews with the pilots, it was observed that some of the
pilots were able to adopt different strategies of controlling airspeed in the absence of airspeed
information. Some of the pilots seemed to utilize visual pitch pictures, known power-settings,
and vertical velocity indications. The varying headwind that was introduced in the experimental
trials, albeit a much stronger headwind than used in the practice approaches, might not have been
enough to render unusable certain “techniques” pilots use to control airspeed in the absence of
airspeed information. Methods can be utilized in future research to minimize the use of these
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techniques. For example, the final approach segment could be flown without visual references in
a setting that would require participants to fly a precision instrument approach, although this
would limit the participants to instrument-rated pilots only. While this would reduce the
possibility of using visual pitch pictures, pitch can nevertheless still be set on the attitude
indicator. In addition, other instruments such as the vertical velocity indicator cannot be taken
away from the instrumentation as the setting would progressively become more and more
unrealistic.
The question is whether it is even desired to negate the effects of techniques used by
certain pilots because the goal is to establish the usage of AOA indication as a secondary source
to already tried and tested concepts such as pitch and power. The effects of already established
techniques might vary from pilot to pilot but it will be difficult, if not impossible and undesired,
to isolate these effects.
Motivational Effects
Motivation effects might have biased the outcome of the experiment. It was noticed that
participants flying with an AOA indicator were visibly hyped about the fact that they got to
experience a new instrument. AOA indicators are common for military aircraft, especially for
fighter-type airplanes. Some participants remembered seeing AOA indicators used for aircraft
carrier landings. It could be argued that this provided strong motivational effects and a
“coolness” factor that increased overall performance for participants in the AOA group. Further
experiments could introduce another instrument to the control group that provides the same
motivational factors, although it might be hard to find such an instrument.
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Misconceptions
Misconceptions about AOA were noticed in some participants while the training on the
AOA indicator was given. Some pilots had previously heard about AOA indicators and were
thinking that an AOA indicator would show indications about the glideslope. They thought for
example that, if the downward pointing chevron illuminates on the AOA indicator, this would
indicate that they are above the glideslope for final approach and had to descent. These
misconceptions had to be eliminated during the training but might still have had some carryover
effects to performance. This might contribute to the relatively large confidence interval evident
in the RMSE glideslope data for the No-AOA group (see Figure 21).
Floor Effect
A floor effect in airspeed RMSE was due to the fact that the participants were given an
airspeed range that could theoretically be flown without error. Interestingly, while not expected,
one participant in the No-AOA condition was able to fly entirely within the desired airspeed
range. This might have been purely due to luck or due to the fact that the participant was able to
successfully employ one or more of the techniques described earlier in this chapter.
Theoretically, such a floor effect might have also been present in the glideslope data due
to the nature of the PAPIs having an allowable range for a 3° glideslope indication. One way to
avoid a floor effect for the glideslope measure would be to have participants conduct an
approach with the usage of an instrument landing system which again would limit the
participants to instrument-rated pilots only. The possible drawbacks of limiting the sample do not
seem to outweigh the benefits of guaranteeing a measure without floor effects. This is especially
true considering the fact that a floor effect in the glideslope measure seems to be possible but
unlikely.
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In the case of airspeed indications, there is no way to eliminate floor effects when using
the relatively intuitive AOA indicator that was used in this experiment. The AOA indicator has
an allowable range that maps to optimum AOA for an approach. This range will always translate
to a range of airspeed and never to an exact airspeed value. The only way to counter this effect
would be to use a different AOA indicator. It is questionable, though, whether one would want to
sacrifice the intuitiveness of an AOA indicator for the sole reason of being able to collect better
data. In addition, the fact that only one participant was able to fly the whole approach within the
desired airspeed range, producing an airspeed deviation of exactly zero, leads to the conclusion
that this effect might not have impacted the overall findings.
Stall Warning Findings
It is interesting in itself that only 12.5% of participants in the AOA group let the airspeed
decline to a point at which the stall warning became active, whereas in the No-AOA group 50%
of participants experienced a stall warning. This further strengthens the finding that an AOA
indicator increases overall safety of flying by warning the pilot of a high AOA, which, if allowed
to increase, could lead to a stall. Participants in the AOA condition most likely recognized the
red downward pointing chevron and the need to decrease the AOA before allowing the AOA to
increase to a point at which the aircraft would be getting too close to a stall. It can thus be argued
that an AOA indicator can increase the safety buffer surrounding a stall threshold if its
indications are acted upon.
Towards the Usage of AOA for GA
Experiments of this kind are beneficial not only as a scientific contribution but also by
increasing overall awareness of a problem. Comments from participants such as that they learned
a lot during the experiment and an overall resulting favorable attitude towards AOA indication
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indicate that they were eager to become more familiar with the overall concept of AOA
instrumentation. “Getting the word out” to the pilots is the first step in making flying operations
safer.
In terms of safety, the findings of this experiment speak for themselves. This research has
established the AOA indicator as an instrument that can enhance aerodynamic awareness and act
as a backup instrument in the case of an airspeed indicator malfunction. As such, displaying
AOA to the pilot enhances safety in the absence of reliable airspeed information in the cockpit.
Other possible benefits should be evaluated in future research in order to provide further
scientific contributions to a topic that is deemed of utmost importance to flight safety (e.g., FAA,
2012; GAJSC, 2012).
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APPENDIX A
Permission to Conduct Research

Embry-Riddle Aeronautical University
Application for IRB Approval
Determination Form
13-142
Principle Investigator: Dr. Kelly Neville
Other Investigators: Claas Tido Boesser
Project Title: The Effects of Angle of Attack Indication on Maintaining System Resilience in
the Event of an Airspeed Indicator Malfunction
Submission Date: December 10, 2012
Determination Date: December 21, 2012

Review Board Use Only
Initial Reviewer: Teri Vigneau/Bert Boquet
Exempt: X Yes
Approved: X Yes

__ No
___ No

Comments: The purpose of this research experiment is to evaluate a pilot’s ability to maintain or
regain aircraft control with the usage of an angle of attack (AOA) indicator in case of an airspeed
indicator malfunction while flying a final approach. Participants will be required to fly final
approaches in a flight simulator. Since this experiment takes place in a flight simulator, there will
be no risks to participants and so this may be determined to be exempt. [Teri Vigneau 12-10-12]
This protocol is exempt. [Bert Boquet 12-10-12]
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APPENDIX B
Informed Consent Form
The effects of angle-of-attack indication on maintaining system resilience when confronted with
an aircraft malfunction
conducted by Claas-Tido Boesser
Advisor: Dr. Neville
College of Arts & Sciences
Human Factors Department
600 South Clyde Morris Blvd., Daytona Beach, FL, 32114
The experiment you are about to participate in is concerned with examining possible
advantageous effects of in-cockpit angle-of-attack (AOA) indications during flight. Specifically,
the purpose is to evaluate the importance of providing pilots with feedback about fundamental
aircraft aerodynamics during emergency situations and unexpected disturbances. The outcome of
this study might help improve flight safety by providing insight into the effectiveness of AOA
indicators.
The study consists of six practice approaches flown to Daytona Beach International
Airport, followed by experimental trial approaches. During the experimental trial approaches you
will be confronted with a possible malfunction. Depending on the group you are in (nonAOA/AOA), all approaches will be performed with or without in-cockpit AOA indication.
The whole experiment will take no longer than one and a half hours and there are no
known risks with this experiment. You will be compensated for this experiment with $20. You
may terminate your participation at any time and will be paid for the time you have already
completed. Your assistance will help us understand the effectiveness of in-cockpit AOA
indication.
We will keep your personal records private and confidential. Any information collected
during this session will only be used for scientific purposes. We may publish the results of this
study. If we do, we will not include your name. We will not publish anything that would let
people know who you are or how you are connected to this study.
Thank you for your participation. If you have any questions, please ask during the
experiment or contact me at (940)-337-6455. If you have any questions or complaints that you
might not want to address directly with me, you can contact my advisor at (386)-226-4922.
Statement of consent
I acknowledge that my participation in this experiment is entirely voluntary and that I am
free to withdraw at any time. I have been informed as to the general scientific purposes of the
experiment and that I will receive a remuneration fee of $20 upon completion of the study.
Participant’s name (please print):

_________________

Signature of participant:

_________________ Date: _________

Experimenter:

_________________ Date: _________
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APPENDIX C
Demographics Form
Thank you for your participation in this experiment. This form asks you about general
demographic information and your piloting experience. We will use this information mainly to
determine possible relationships between flight experience and experimental results.
Please provide the following information
1. Your age:
2. Circle the certificate(s) you are holding:
Private
Commercial
Airline Transport Pilot
Flight Instructor
3. Are you instrument-rated?
Yes

No

4. Approximate total number of flight hours:
5. Of the total flight hours, approximately how many hours were flown in technologically
advanced aircraft, i.e. “glass-cockpit”?
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APPENDIX D
Feedback for Participants of Angle-of-Attack Research
Human Factors Department
Embry-Riddle Aeronautical University
First of all, thank you for your participation in this experiment. The data recorded during
this experiment will be of great value not only for my research but also for aviation safety. The
experiment you have just completed will give more insight into possible advantageous effects of
angle-of-attack (AOA) instrumentation. If you were part of the control group and did not get the
opportunity to fly with an AOA indexer, please be assured that the data collected from your
participation is of utmost importance in order to be able to make reasonable conclusions about
differences between flying with or without AOA instrumentation.
Effectiveness of in-cockpit AOA indication is assessed in this research by posing three
distinct questions. First, will pilots flying a final approach with in-cockpit AOA indications
notice a frozen airspeed indication earlier than pilots flying without AOA indication? Second,
will pilots flying with in-cockpit AOA indication be able to fly an overall more stable approach
than pilots without in-cockpit AOA indication after being confronted with an airspeed indicator
malfunction? And finally, if there is a degradation of aircraft control due to airspeed indicator
malfunction, will pilots with in-cockpit AOA indication be able to recover from such degradation
quicker than pilots flying without in-cockpit AOA indication. Together, these three questions
aim at providing a starting point for quantitative AOA effectiveness research.
The Federal Aviation Administration underlines the importance of AOA and stall
awareness and has just recently (August 2012) published Advisory Circular #120-109 (Stall and
Stick Pusher Training) in the wake of related accidents. In addition, at the beginning of 2012, the
FAA has declared the installation of certain AOA systems in GA aircraft as minor alterations
requiring only a logbook entry instead of a full-up Form 337 installation approval process, thus
facilitating the installation of such systems. The industry and experts agree that AOA
information can be very beneficial to flight safety but there aren’t any studies that exclusively
employ quantitative measures like the current experiment does. You have been an essential part
of helping to fill this gap. We might see more AOA indicators in modern cockpits, maybe some
retrofitting of existing airplanes and maybe you even find yourself flying with an AOA indicator
soon.
Allow me to ask you for one final favor:
Because this experiment is built around the airspeed indicator malfunction, it will be of
utmost importance that you do not talk to your friends or colleagues about the exact activities of
the experiment, especially not about the malfunction being an airspeed indicator malfunction,
otherwise the results of this experiment will end up being distorted. Please be considerate and
help me conduct research that can be beneficial to aviation safety in the future.
Should you wish to learn more about this research or have any other questions about the
topic, please feel free to contact me at any time at boesserc@my.erau.edu. Thank you again for
your participation.
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APPENDIX E
Experiment Script
Before participant arrives:

-‐
-‐
-‐
-‐
-‐
-‐
-‐
-‐

Load correct plane for condition
Check joystick in XPlane / set throttle idle
Check button mapping to 0
Set weather: 10 kts headwind (lo-stratus 8000-8SM vis)
Clear all malfunctions
Press “s” and “key up” to setup view
Release brakes
Setup new folder with participant number and setup first approach

When participant arrives:

-‐
-‐
-‐
-‐

Welcome participant
Participant reads and signs informed consent
Participant receives $20 and signs Participant Verification Form
Participant fills out demographic worksheet

-‐

“Thank you, this is a script I read to every participant”

-‐

“The experiment you are about to participate in is concerned with examining possible
advantageous effects of in-cockpit angle-of-attack (AOA) indications during flight.”

-‐

“The study consists of six practice approaches flown to Daytona Beach International
Airport, followed by experimental trial approaches. During the experimental trial
approaches you will be confronted with a possible malfunction. Depending on the group
you are in (non-AOA/AOA), all approaches will be performed with or without in-cockpit
AOA indication.”

-‐

“You will conduct 3 practice trials to familiarize yourself with the AOA indicator,
followed by 3 practice trials to fly stabilized approaches”
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-‐

“Following the practice trials, you will fly experimental trials with different headwind
settings and a encounter a possible malfunction”

-‐

“The simulation starts with the aircraft located on a 3NM final Runway 34 at Daytona
Beach, on glideslope, about 90 knots, 10 knots headwind”

-‐

“Your task is as follows in order:
o Maintain a 3 degree glideslope using the PAPIs and directional alignment with the
centerline
o Slowdown to 60-65 knots as quickly as possible for a no-flap straight-in
o Fly a stabilized approach with a 3 degree glideslope and at 60-65 knots
o If malfunction is encountered, continue to fly approach as stable as possible
o The simulator will freeze before touchdown

-‐

Explain the following
o Brake light normal
o Stall warning
o Explain controls and Trim
o Explain throttle movement at beginning of simulation

-‐

Introduce procedure when resetting computer

-‐

Show AOA presentation

-‐

Any questions?

Practice Trials
-‐
-‐

Setup for 6 trials combined
After each, check throttle idle

Experimental Trials
-‐
-‐
-‐
-‐
-

Inform participant about wind conditions
Inform participant about possible malfunction and which button to press
Inform participant not to break off approach “continue to fly as smooth as possible”
First trial, set headwind to 30 knots
Hack clock

-‐

Third trial, choose Approach with ASI Failure and set headwind to 25 knots
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After the experiment
-

Handout post-flight questionnaire

-‐

Handout debriefing form

-‐
-‐

Save participant data to USB stick and Laptop
Write participant number on all sheets
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APPENDIX F
PowerPoint Slides Used for Training Participants on Angle-of-Attack

Slide 1. Illustrating relationships between AOA, centerline of the aircraft, and actual flight path.
Adapted from “A Search for Meaning: A Case Study of the Approach-to-Landing” by Flach et
al., 2003.

Slide 2. Critical angle of attack and stall. Adapted from “The Airplane Flying Handbook” by the
Federal Aviation Administration, 2004, p. 4-3.
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Slide 3. Different possible indications of the AOA indicator. Screenshots taken from X-Plane by
Laminar Research.
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Appendix G
Excerpt from Excel Data Generated by the Plugin for X-Plane
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